Federal Constitutional Reforms under the Threat of Secession? Conditions and Options for a Renewed Federalism in Spain

Traditionally, the Spanish version of federalism, through its main state-wide parties, had responded to regional nationalist demands through a combination of empowerment, additional devolution of resources and informal inclusion in federal policy-making, with more reluctant recourse to symbolic recognition, as seen in the recent reform of the Statute of Catalonia. The recent conversion of the mainstream nationalist party in Catalonia to secessionism, and the increasing secessionist sentiment amongst the population seems to be altering the traditional rules of constitutional negotiation and the constellation of actors’ strategies, alongside the full panoply of available responses to achieve accommodation, even questioning the likelihood or effectiveness of a settlement. By looking at other federal cases with secessionist tensions, this paper will analyze the new constellation and identify the different options available for federal actors in Spain (e.g. the prospects of formal constitutional change and the need and feasibility for a Plan B) and the conditions for a successful response to the double challenge of accommodating a radicalized Catalan nationalist movement and a disaffected population.