The contributors to this symposium critically examine the numerous dimensions of Europe’s policy response to the crisis of the Euro area, drawing conclusions about how the crisis has driven forward the European integration process, and about what kind of European Union – in terms especially of the relocation of power and authority, and transfer or pooling of sovereignty - is emerging. Given that the Euro-area crisis remains highly fluid, the situation is ripe for close analysis from a variety of perspectives. Key countries have played to type: France has insisted on strong agreements, but without giving up sovereignty; Germany wants stricter budgetary measures and warns against quick fixes, but is willing to accept deeper integration; the UK has demanded ‘special protections’. And yet the various agreements made since 2009 in response to the crisis (fiscal compacts, new forms of fiscal surveillance, initial banking union agreements, etc.) all signal a quite novel set of compromises in intergovernmental bargaining and an enhanced role for the European institutions - but ones that challenge the politics and prior constitutional settlement of the European Union, as well as the tools traditionally used to analyze the integration process.