Friday, July 10, 2015
H007 (28 rue des Saints-Pères)
Historically, peacekeeping and peace enforcement have been distinct endeavors, both in doctrine and in practice. Peacekeeping entails implementing peace accords after lengthy negotiations, and abiding by the three doctrinal rules of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force. In contrast, peace enforcement entails using force to either defeat a dissenting party or coerce them to sign onto a peace accord. The rise of peace enforcement (both normatively and in practice) coincides with the rise of a norm against negotiating with terrorists. These ideational shifts originated in NATO and EU military doctrine, and have altered European and international action away from concluding civil wars through negotiations and toward the attempted use of force to defeat dissenting parties. This paper traces the ideational birth and evolution of the norm of peace enforcement, and its institutional manifestation in peace operations conducted by France, NATO, the UN, the AU and the EU. I argue that international ideational change has led to the implementation of peace enforcement policies that have had the unintended consequence of prolonging, rather than ending, civil wars.