Friday, July 10, 2015
H007 (28 rue des Saints-Pères)
Reforming security forces remains a core challenge for intervention in crisis and conflict-affected countries. The EU has emerged as a major player in building state institutions after conflict, through its provision of development assistance and specialized expertise, and as source of normative standards and influence over policy. Yet the impact of EU efforts on institutional change has been mixed – both within the Western Balkans and beyond Europe, poorly governed and managed security forces remain one of the core obstacles to stability and economic development despite serious efforts to reform them. This paper assesses the impact of EU involvement in crisis countries on the transformation of state institutions, focusing on the governance and management of police and military forces. Based on an analysis of all cases of conflict termination since the end of the Cold War, I find that the impact of intervention on security institutions depends more on the political processes through which external actors influence policy decisions than on the technical dimensions of reform. Institutional change is most likely when leaders depend most on external support, as a result of internal political threats or revenue dependence, and when external actors organize their assistance to achieve both leverage and normative influence, by aligning objectives, managing information asymmetries, and cultivating trust with recipient officials. Through two cases of intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of Congo, I show how EU intervention architecture presents both unique advantages and weaknesses for achieving influence in stabilization and state-building operations.