State Capture, Corruption and Party Competition Under Post-Communism

Studies that focus on democratic change through elections often neglect the role of political parties in determining the durability and quality of what appear to be democratic breakthroughs in the post-communist region. I argue that political parties are the most important and proximate source of political change, and ask: Under what conditions does party competition foster or undermine high level corruption and state capture? Does an "anti-corruption" agenda ever translate into meaningful change when these parties gain office? What factors have shaped party agendas -- and moved parties to deepen or loosen their capture of the state and the economy? Do external actors play a leading role in compelling parties to change their agendas and secure political rights? I hypothesize that party systems of EU candidate states do follow a predictable evolution over time – and this is caused by participation in the EU’s pre-accession process. Major political parties respond to EU leverage by "adapting" to agendas that are consistent with EU requirements in the run up to negotiations for membership -- including taking some concrete institutional steps to decrease rent-seeking and strengthen independent state institutions.