The EU and Islamist Actors after the Arab Uprisings: Selective Engagement, Cognitive Frames and Domestic Factors

For a long time the European Union (EU) avoided dealing with Islamist movements and parties due to security concerns. The Arab transition processes that started in 2011 have significantly altered the political situation in some countries of the southern rim of the Mediterranean. This has led to the creation of Islamist-dominated parliamentary majorities and governments such as the Muslim Brotherhood-led government in Egypt between 2012 and 2013 and the En-Nahda-led one in Tunisia. This transformation has opened up opportunities for change in the EU’s approach to Islamist actors, but at the same time it has required a substantial change in its approach and policies vis-à-vis these actors after years of disengagement. This paper focuses on the EU’s engagement (or lack thereof) with the Islamist actors in Egypt and Tunisia following the Arab uprisings. It argues that the EU has opted for a selective engagement with Islamist actors - be they political parties or civil society organisations, characterised by a ‘wait-and-see’ approach, which ultimately lacks clearly defined policy options. This approach can be explained by the cognitive frame that has been used to interpret ongoing changes in the region, which has in turn been influenced by the domestic context in the two countries and the development paths of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia.