This panel considers the center-periphery dynamics that have characterized the Eurozone in the course of  Europe's economic crisis. The papers by Perez and coauthors and Hardiman et al. consider competing explanations for  the debt imbalances that emerged in the Eurozone during the run up to the  sovereign debt crisis: from structural features of late development  to the governance structure of the Eurozone and  changes in the growth models of some creditor ( or core) states. These different explanations of the  divide between creditor and debtor states have important implications for the debate on institutional reform of the Eurzone.  Kenneth Dyson explains how ideas about "good", "bad", and "sustainable"  debt  have helped to justify the response of EU institutions and creditor state governments, specifically their demand that debt imbalances be addressed through austerity measures in the debtor states rather than debt restructuring or mutualization.  Armingeon and Sacchi's paper focuses on the implications of austerity for democratic  legitimacy and accountability. It argues that austerity has limited democratic choice in Germany (a Eurozone creditor state), Italy (a Eurozone debtor state), but also Switzerland (a non-Eurozone state).  Enderlein's paper explain's the trilemma between sovereignty, crisis management, and moral hazard in terms of which the debt crisis is often framed, and proposes a solution to this trilemma.   The panel brings together scholars working from both a political economy and a normative perspective. It thereby seeks to encourage discussion of the role that  ideas - in particular those surrounding "debt" - and structural features of the Eurozone (both economic and institutional) each have played in the crisis.