Empowering and Constraining the European Commission in Development Policy

In this paper we compare the evolution of delegation patterns in EU’s trade and development policies. In terms of institutional empowerment the EU’s authority to act in trade was exclusive and universal from the start, while its initial reach in development cooperation was only parallel and partial. Albeit not exclusive, the EU today has development cooperation capabilities comparable to those of industrialized nation states. We then survey the various control mechanisms that Member States have established to check the Commission-as-agent in both areas. In development the Commission was “captured” by France until the mid-1980s, making for a form of particularistic principal control. Concerning monitoring mechanisms, police-patrols are more extensive in trade than in development cooperation, despite of the fact that fire-patrols are more effective in trade. We explain this conundrum with the higher salience and more immediate impact on Member States’ national welfare, leading principals to fear even minor delegation losses.