Over the past decades, EU Member States have delegated substantial powers to supranational organizations. The papers assembled in this panel tackle the question whether internal and external delegation patterns in the EU differ considerably across institutions and policy areas. The papers deal with logics of accountability of EU institutions during the Euro crisis. In the area of external relations, trade and development aid will be compared in a longitudinal comparative research design ranging from the Treaty of Rome to Lisbon to yield insight into different factors explaining varying levels of discretion granted to the Commission. In comitology, the dichotomy of delegated and implementing acts introduced by the Lisbon Treaty will be examined to identify the conditions under which the European Parliament and Council will settle for either of the two forms. In political economy, the session will investigate the impact of economic imperatives coupled with political inaction on the independence and legitimacy of central banks in the EU and United States. In the field of European regulatory agencies for markets, which have been set up in network industries and finance, panellists compare the formal pattern of delegation with the informal development of liberalization and re-regulation of markets.