Russia’s Soft Power in the Western Balkans

Since 2000, under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, Russia’s foreign policy began to use its soft power influence in the Western Balkans. Joseph Nye, Harvard Professor, was the first to formulate “soft power” as an “attractive power,” which “arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”

This presentation considers more specifically Russia’s soft power in Serbia because Serbia has been Russia’s main ally in the Western Balkans for centuries. In the past decade, Russia has augmented its presence through soft power tools like public diplomacy; traditionally close religious, historical and cultural ties; media; energy deals; and other forms of trade. By contrast, the European Union and the West have already established soft power in Serbia through media, trade, and diplomacy by cooperating with Serbian political elite in areas such as European Union and transatlantic policies, the NATO Partnership for Peace Program, and other kinds of “soft power” through state laws and rules.

However, the Eurozone crisis in 2008, Brexit in 2016 as well as the migrant crisis and the EU’s quota system for accepting asylum-seekers have caused alarm. The Balkan countries are already struggling to provide for large numbers of migrants at a time when their own citizens face mass unemployment and poverty. These flings the door wide open for Russia to expand its influence in Serbia. I will argue that by using soft power tools, Russia attempts to fill the gaps and address the inconsistencies in the European Union’s policies.