Why the Fine Print Matters: Electoral Systems and Regulatory Policies for Implementing Party Quotas in Germany and Austria

Thursday, March 29, 2018
Ohio (InterContinental Chicago Magnificent Mile)
Petra Ahrens , Department of Political Science, University of Antwerp, Belgium
Katja Chmilewski , University of Vienna, Austria
Sabine Lang , Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington
Birgit Sauer , Political Science, University of Vienna, Austria
In Germany and in Austria, the representation of women in national parliaments is characterized by a “gender quota gap”: Although in both countries most parties have implemented party quotas for electoral lists, the share of women in national parliaments remains below the quota. Comparing the most similar cases Austria and Germany – similar with respect to their federal structure, their strong “party democracy” and their party quota systems histories – this paper aims at explaining the “gender quota gap” by way of analyzing the implementation of gender quota policies in the two federations.
Comparing state and substate effects of party quotas in three major parties - social democrats, Christian conservatives, Green Party -, we assess modes of compliance on the federal and Länder levels and stipulate that it is primarily the fine print of how electoral party lists are drafted and the electoral system itself that create deviations from set party quota policies. Candidate selection in the German mixed electoral system is compared to the Austrian proportional system as to their impact on female candidate selection and success. Moreover, different commitments to and levels of sanctions on the state and substate level and among parties contribute to uneven implementation in the German and Austrian federations.
The paper draws on gendered candidate and election data, on party statutes of federal and state party organizations and on interviews with party officials and party women’s organizations.
Paper
  • Why the Fine Print matters_Chicago.pdf (1.1 MB)