Strengthening Social Safety Nets in Latin America and Southern Europe? Trade Unions and Pro-Outsider Policies in Argentina and Italy

Non-contributive income transfers to working-age individuals have traditionally lagged behind both in Southern Europe and in Latin America. Four key factors, identified by comparative political research, help to explain the marginality of such programmes in Southern Europe, and might also be applied to Latin America: the role of the family as welfare provider, the extent of the underground economy, “timing”, and low administrative capacity. These features limit demand (as people in need can access other sources of income to mitigate material deprivation) and also supply (as low institutional capacity has fuelled the concern that such programmes might give rise to corruption and clientelism). Incentives to introduce non-contributive income transfers are further limited by the low mobilization potential and political resources of potential beneficiaries. Against this background, the paper compares the introduction of a conditional cash transfer in Argentina with that of a peculiar minimum income benefit in Italy. Through an in-depth comparative analysis of the political process built on a process-tracing methodology, the paper shows that, in the shadow of a different configuration of contextual factors (functional pressures, policy legacy and external pressures), the ability to build pro-outsider coalitions may hinge on the willingness of trade unions to reach out to new constituencies and redistributive demands.