Thursday, March 29, 2018
Ohio (InterContinental Chicago Magnificent Mile)
How can judicial actors effectively prosecute complex and pervasive criminal phenomena? I show that
improvements in the prosecution of pervasive criminal systems, such as the control over local administrations exerted by mafia organizations, depends on judicial actors' relationship with local social activists, and with their peers working in other jurisdictions. While judicial actors can acquire precious insights into the nature of complex criminal issues from local activists, their participation in judicial networks is also essential to the diffusion and accumulation of legal expertise. Moreover, I show that local judicial institutions will affect the degree to which local judicial actors actively network with their peers in other jurisdictions. Specifically, meritocratic or egalitarian methods of judicial governance will incentivize participation in judicial networks, and therefore will promote the accumulation of legal expertise over time. I use process tracing to assess this theory on two most similar cases, namely two Southern Italian jurisdictions facing the pervasive involvement of mafia organizations in every criminal dealing, including corruption. In Palermo, the regional capital of Sicily, methods of judicial governance based on team work and equality among prosecutors and judges incentivized these actors' participation in a larger judicial network, and the accumulation of legal expertise on the prosecution of mafia organizations. On the other hand, methods of local judicial governance in Reggio Calabria, the capital of the neighboring region of Calabria, isolated and alienated younger judges, therefore leading to a lack of judicial expertise, and a lack of effective judicial action against mafia organizations.
improvements in the prosecution of pervasive criminal systems, such as the control over local administrations exerted by mafia organizations, depends on judicial actors' relationship with local social activists, and with their peers working in other jurisdictions. While judicial actors can acquire precious insights into the nature of complex criminal issues from local activists, their participation in judicial networks is also essential to the diffusion and accumulation of legal expertise. Moreover, I show that local judicial institutions will affect the degree to which local judicial actors actively network with their peers in other jurisdictions. Specifically, meritocratic or egalitarian methods of judicial governance will incentivize participation in judicial networks, and therefore will promote the accumulation of legal expertise over time. I use process tracing to assess this theory on two most similar cases, namely two Southern Italian jurisdictions facing the pervasive involvement of mafia organizations in every criminal dealing, including corruption. In Palermo, the regional capital of Sicily, methods of judicial governance based on team work and equality among prosecutors and judges incentivized these actors' participation in a larger judicial network, and the accumulation of legal expertise on the prosecution of mafia organizations. On the other hand, methods of local judicial governance in Reggio Calabria, the capital of the neighboring region of Calabria, isolated and alienated younger judges, therefore leading to a lack of judicial expertise, and a lack of effective judicial action against mafia organizations.
