Multilevel Governance and the Reform of the Nation State. a Comparative Analysis

During the last decades, researchers and policymakers emphasized the transfer of political authority from national governments to other levels, that is, upwards, downwards and sideward. During the same period, governments in advanced democracies also reformed their politico-administrative systems, namely by reinforcing the integration of policy sectors and by reforming administrative coordination with respect to pressing policy challenges. Whereas previous research has demonstrated that the establishment of a European agency makes such reforms more likely, this paper focuses on the impact of the subnational level. I hold that higher subnational autonomy, especially fiscal autonomy, reduces the probability of policy integration at the national level, whereas veto points of the of subnational governments in policy and constitutional reforms at the national level reduce the probability of administrative coordination reforms because in such contexts subnational governments deal with reforms of policy competencies on their own. Nevertheless, if regions have a strong voice in fiscal competencies and lawmaking at the national level, reforms that increase coordination of administrative elements at the national level are more likely. This is so because if they have a voice, regions are more likely accept state reforms at the federal level. To buttress this argument empirically, this paper conducts multilevel analyses that estimate reform activity concerning policy integration and administrative coordination using an original dataset that compares four policy fields – environment, immigration, public health, and unemployment in thirteen countries (eight EU members and five non-EU members) covering the period from 1985-2014.