The Resonance of Pegida: Right-Wing Populism Beyond the ' Losers of Globalization '

The rise of the right-wing populist protest movement Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) in Dresden since 2014 signals a major shift in the post-reunification German political landscape. Its enduring presence indicates that the country can no longer be considered immune to expressions of unabashed nationalism. The unexpected character of Pegida’s rise lies in its appeal to ‘ordinary citizens’, including those from the middle class who don’t necessarily identify with right-wing politics and emphatically distance themselves from neo-Nazis. What, then, explains Pegida’s resonance? Drawing on participant observation at a Dresden rally, Pegida position documents and television interviews with Dresden demonstrators, this paper argues that Islam is not the single issue that mobilizes Pegida supporters. To be sure, nativist and neo-nationalist sensibilities expressed by Pegida leadership and local demonstrators are permeated by attitudes of cultural pessimism, salient in fears of ‘foreign invasion’, demographic decline and ‘parallel societies’. Yet, feelings of resentment tied to socioeconomic concerns also occupy a prominent place in grievances voiced by Dresden protesters. This is most salient in expressions of economic chauvinism directed at ‘parasitical foreigners’, who are believed to put undue strains on the labour market and welfare provisions. The movement translates social insecurity into a sense of cultural threat. Nevertheless, the paper takes issue with the oft-repeated claim that right-wing populism appeals chiefly to the ‘losers of globalization’, as Pegida supporters’ cultural and socio-economic anxieties constitute less a reaction to actual loss of status than fears of losing out in the future.