Killing Them with Kindness: The Influence of Parties’ Distributive Strategies on Voters’ Tolerance of Political Graft

Political graft is recognized as an objectionable practice by both voters and elected representatives. Yet, while the latter practice it, the former fail to consistently punish it. Why is this the case? Why does political graft, despite its adverse effects on economic growth, political culture and democratic consolidation, persist across Europe’s transitioning democracies? And, what conditions enable its persistence despite voter indignation at its pervasiveness and even in the presence of mechanisms of democratic accountability? To examine the conditions that underlie spatial and temporal variation in patterns of political graft in transitioning states, this project assesses the link between voters’ tolerance of political corruption and strategies adopted by parties to preempt voters’ electoral fury. I develop a theoretical model of "corruption insurance” which argues that parties act strategically (both proactively and retroactively) to ameliorate or redirect voter wrath. In efforts to boost their support among potential defectors, incumbents compensate the electorate by strategically targeting higher shares of government resources to regions most affected by political graft and most likely to punish its occurrence. To systematically test the theory, I combine a multivariate empirical analysis with qualitative evidence from the transitioning democracy of Albania. I find preliminary support for the extended hypotheses.