Alienation, Ideal Theory, and Ideology Critique

There are few notions as central to the practice of critical social philosophy as that of ideologiekritik. On the standard picture, we begin with the observation that agents are deluded about themselves, their society, or their interests. Ideological delusion or ideological false consciousness is what, on this view, prevents agents from realizing the circumstances that they’re actually in and/or their true interests, and critique is directed towards a kind of enlightenment, whereby agents realize that they’re acting contrary to “what is manifestly in their own true interest.” Often, though, when discussing ideology, the central focus is on delusional or ideological beliefs (this, for instance, is how Marxist critics often read the tradition). My topic here is in what sense we should think about ideology as a matter of having false beliefs. In my paper, I’m interested in critically reconstructing an alternate picture of ideology that looks to two ways of being ideological outside of having false beliefs: ideology as a matter of false aspiration or values (that is, aspirations that are structurally unrealizable) and ideology as principally about ways of seeing.