The idea that countries and governments face a limited choice among competing growth models has received growing attention recently. Growth models allow for greater attention to the problems of inadequate demand and income distribution in post-Fordist societies than competing theoretical paradigms. To advance the debate on the political underpinning of growth models, we envision two consecutive panels. They bring together a number of scholars working on the emergence and outcomes of growth models in advanced capitalist economies.

Panel one tackles the political underpinning of growth models in broad terms while focusing on Germany and the US. Baccaro/Pontusson adapt Gramsci’s social blocs approach, which they distinguish from other approaches focusing on social coalitions. They argue that the politics of growth and distribution are more closely linked to one other than the literature on partisan convergence and divergence suggests. By tracing Germany’s export-surplus orientation over time, Höpner argues that national economies develop this orientation institutional and organizational capacities and political willingness are combined with a favorable exchange rate regime to produce a real undervaluation constellation. Deeg/Braun address the dramatic change in Germany’s financial system and the continuity of its export-led growth model. They argue that there are deeper complementarities between the German growth model and a dispersed corporate ownership structure dominated by large foreign asset managers. Lastly, Schwartz argues that growth regimes help to make sense of sectoral level welfare states and to illuminate the economic and social contradictions in the US.