“There is no alternative to the Euro”: member statehood and Eurozone governance

This paper looks at the impact of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis on macro-economic governance processes at the European level. Taking on those that see in the crisis a marked shift towards a more centralized and supranational set of policymaking tools, the paper argues that the underlying structure of the EU remains that of cooperation between nation-states. However, the crisis has emphasized the differences between national economies within the Eurozone and has established a clear demarcation between debtor and creditor states. The institutions of the Eurozone, namely the ECB, and the new Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, do not represent a transfer of competences to the European level. Rather, they serve as agents of creditor states and express the more punitive and coercive logic that is entering into Eurozone governance mechanisms. Nevertheless, we must also account for the willingness of all states within the Eurozone to subject themselves to these new regimes of governance. The paper argues that the underlying structure of macro-economic governance in Europe re-enforces a process of state transformation within Europe, from nation-states to member states. A key feature of member statehood is the manner in which national executives exercise their authority via external frameworks of rule. The ongoing Eurozone crisis has reinforced member statehood and for this reason no serious alternative to life within the Eurozone has emerged for either debtor or creditor states.