Improving Compliance with Global Rules: The Role of the EU Regional Tier of Governance

States have increasingly engaged in international legislative agreement in a vast array of policy sectors ranging from trade to environmental policies and human rights (Simmons, 1998). The European Union for example has emerged as a regulatory state (Majone, 1996) establishing a supranational model of policy-making and governance based on a detailed legislative framework and enforcing institutional devices (ECJ/ Commission). Other international regimes facilitate and constrain state relations at the supra-national level in salient policy areas such as the WTO trade agreement and new regional initiatives are emerging in Asia and Latin America (Hix, 2010, Kahler, 2010). International regulatory agreements between states and regional coordination have thus become a central mode of governance and policy-making in supra-national political systems.

           However, despite voluntary commitment to such agreements, certain states are tempted to defect and free ride. Failure to comply is particularly damaging for international regulatory regimes that derive their efficiency and credibility from compliance. The current context of economic and political instability calls for coordinated economic and human right policies; which are efficiently implemented at the domestic level. Scholars are divided in determining what shapes compliance and the institutional mechanisms to adopt to solve non-compliance problems international regimes may suffer from. Enforcement theorists understand non-compliance as a deliberate choice by a rational state to violate treaties after weighing the costs and benefits of alternative behaviours (MBaye, 2002; Fearon, 1998; Garrett, 1995; Keohane et al 2000; Mattli and Slaughter 1998, Pollack, 1997; Simmons, 1998; Weingast, 1989), while management theorists interprets infringement as a result of national government capacity limitation and thus privilege tools such as capacity building and monitoring rather than coercive measures to ensure compliance (Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Huber and McCarty, 2004; Marks et al, 1996; Tallberg, 2002). Constructivist theories have also analysed the importance of shared norms and identities in creating cooperative behaviours (Checkel, 2001; Falkner et al, 2005; Heritier, 1996; Knill, 2001; Risse et al., 1999).

This research explores the role of the EU regional tier as an efficient model of governance to improve compliance with global rules. The EU regional tier is based on a model of delegation of enforcement power to supranational institutions, access for private actors to enforcement mechanisms and the application of international laws that are embedded in the rules of the regional organization. This article builds and tests an innovative theoretical model of regional coordination to improve good governance and enforcement of the rule of law. More specifically the article unfolds the causal relationship between the regional tier model of governance and compliance in the areas of economic policies through process tracing of infringement proceedings.

The main findings show functional institutional designs can improve compliance. The regional tier of governance locks EU member states into compliance with legislative agreements from which they cannot easily opt-out, whereas stand-alone states display more flexible patterns of compliance. Also, the regional tier of governance improves compliance with global rules as a side product of efficient and credible commitment at the regional level.