The institutional design of international organizations and the potential for politicization of international governance

International governance becomes increasingly politicized beyond the narrow circle of executive actors with decision-making powers in the international realm. The audience of inter- and supranational policies is widening, public opinion is diversifying, and various societal actors mobilise resistance or confront international institutions with new demands. Not the least the history of the European Constitution or the public responses to EU and IMF policies during the European debt crisis forcefully underline this development and indicate how strongly the extant mode of executive governance is challenged.

Recent literature has linked this politicization to the growing authority of the international level but also points to significant variation of politicization across time and international organizations. Thus, our contribution provides a more refined view on the nexus of international authority and politicization. Distinguishing several policy functions of international organizations, we discuss which institutional design features raise or suppress the probability that international decisions are politicized beyond the set of directly participating executive actors. Along features such as the discretion of international bodies in agenda setting, the inclusiveness of the various decision-making stages, and the stringency of enforcement rules we offer a classification of international organisation from which testable hypotheses on the nexus of international authority and its politicization can be derived.