The Politics of Implementing European Court of Human Rights Judgements

Why are some European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgements implemented quickly while others are implemented belatedly or not at all? We analyze this question using a new database of nearly 1000 leading ECtHR cases. We integrate arguments from managerialists, who highlight variation in bureaucratic capacity, and enforcement theorists, who stress incentive structures. We argue that the effect of managerial and enforcement variables is conditional on the implementation task. We find strong support for this argument. The importance of bureaucratic capacity decreases strongly and significantly the longer a case remains pending. By contrast, domestic political constraints and stable democracy initially slow down the implementation of judgements but judgements that are pending longer are more likely to be implemented in stable democracies and states with checks on the executive. Moreover, more constrained executives are more likely to implement controversial judgments on torture and inhumane treatment.