Risk Sharing Between Member States through Migration As a Social Right

Economists claim that the European monetary union would work so much better if labor mobility were higher. But economic models treat workers’ migration to another member state essentially in the same way as workers’ changing jobs within the domestic economy. The jurisprudence on free movement of persons (workers and services) and non-discrimination that the CJEU developed over the years can show how different cross-border and within-border movements are. This paper asks for the consequences of the CJEU’s jurisprudence. Does it lead to income smoothing between member states hit differently by economic downturns, as economists claim? Or does it reinforce inequality by depriving the sending member states of their young and relatively well-educated workforce while receiving member states experience additional pressure on low wages and scarce affordable housing? These anxieties arguably drive immigration policies in many member states. To what extent are these effects ameliorated by remittances, entitlements to pensions and family benefits on the one hand, a rejuvenation of the workforce on the other?