The power of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to promote European integration through case law – even in politically sensitive areas such as citizenship and welfare – has been broadly acknowledged and analyzed. Apart from deciding individual conflicts and incrementally developing EU legal doctrine, however, the Court’s broader impact rests on the political absorption of its case law. The papers presented in this panel will address political decision-making affected by and responding to Court-driven integration. At the European level, member states may adopt secondary legislation in order to codify CJEU case law, but also to override or to pre-empt further Court-driven integration. When and under what conditions should we expect EU member states to successfully override previous CJEU case law through EU secondary legislation? At the domestic level, Court jurisprudence may empower interested litigants to push for systematic reform, while member state legislatures and administrations try to minimize the Court’s impact by ‘containing compliance’ and by exploring the limits of their remaining regulatory autonomy. But what determines domestic policy-makers’ willingness and their ability to fully abide by CJEU case law or rather to contain domestic compliance? By addressing these questions, the papers aim at providing a more nuanced picture of the Court’s general impact and also at identifying the potential winners and losers of Court-driven integration.  Substantively, the papers of this panel will focus on welfare policies that have been strongly affected by CJEU free movement jurisprudence in recent years and have triggered considerable public debate.