Wednesday, July 8, 2015
S08 (13 rue de l'Université)
Since 9/11, the UK discourse on 'extremism' has emphasised its 'cumulative' nature (Eatwell 2006), and has found causes in religion and culture, as opposed to geopolitics and communal or personal grievances (McGhee 2008). Like parents of squabbling children, academics and policy makers have sought to note and tackle the escalation of conflict in which one side is pushed to a more extreme position by the actions of the other, eventually leading to spirals of violence. Furthermore, blame has been placed on elements of particular cultures, such that there are groups seen as uniquely susceptible to hatred and violence, and so at high risk of being drawn into the 'cumulative extremism' dynamic. Based on ethnographic research with both radical Islamists, the far-right, and the wider community, this paper demonstrates how explanations of extremism in terms of community and culture have resulted in a widening of the meaning of extremism, such that any threat is greatly exaggerated. Like others before them, white working class and Asian Muslim populations have become 'suspect communities' (Hillyard 1993). Other attributes, unconnected to extremism and sometimes even unproblematic, have become 'suspect' for the purposes of 'community cohesion' and 'Preventing Violent Extremism'. The article concludes by arguing that such definitions and explanations can contribute to societal division, as demonisation provokes anger, and hyperbole causes fear, with processes of 'cumulative extremism' being further driven by mainstream politicians.