One Master Too Many? the European Commission and EU Asylum Policy-Making

With the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), European cooperation on migration experienced a major shift towards the Community method of policy-making. This article analyses the impact of such communitarization in the capacity of the European Commission to set the agenda and shape policy outputs in the asylum policy domain. In this area, it is assumed that the European Commission shares with the European Parliament a “refugee-friendly” attitude and an interest in enhanced harmonization (Kaunert 2009:151). Hence, in terms of policy outputs, the community method would result in higher-than-minimum standards and enhance the quality of protection available for asylum seekers and refugees. Yet, there is evidence that the impact of formal institutions – i.e. the rules governing legislative procedures – may not be unequivocal (see e.g. Acosta 2009 on the role of the European Parliament in migration policy-making under codecision).

The issue of the European Commission’s role is further compounded considering that it now needs to “satisfy” two principals, the Council and the European Parliament, with potentially divergent policy preferences. How has this dual delegation affected the Commission’s way of working and its position both as an agenda-setter and as a broker of compromise? Has its capacity to act as a “liberal constraint” been enhanced or curtailed? The creation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), with its development in two stages, the first under intergovernmental rules and the second under the current community framework, constitutes an ideal scenario to evaluate the Commission’s agency and autonomy under different decision-making settings.