For many years, European cooperation on asylum and migration policies raised concerns about the potentially restrictive impact of such cooperation on the rights of migrants and refugees.  However, the communitarisation of EU asylum and migration policies since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the introduction of Community law and policies since the early 2000s represent a major turning point in the politics of migration and asylum in Europe. It has been observed that the shift of power from the member states to EU institutions such as the Court and the Commission has produced new liberal constraints on member states. 

This raises questions about the role of EU institutions in asylum and migration policies. Can the policy impact of EU institutions such as the Court, the Commission, and the European Parliament in the field of migration and asylum indeed be characterized as a ‘liberal constraint’? How can we explain the (liberal) policy preferences and positions adopted by different EU institutions? At which stages in the policy process (agenda-setting, decision-making, implementation) does this impact become apparent and through which channels does it shape national and EU policies? 

This first session in the symposium focuses on the process of policy design, i.e. on agenda-setting, negotiation, and decision-making. The papers look into how this process is shaped by the way different institutional actors frame the issue of migration, and by the power relations between them.