The aim of this panel is to – from a comparative perspective - discuss the ability of parliaments to ensure accountability in policy areas that are typically associated with strong executive dominance. This is typically the case in policy areas where legislative powers are limited and where parliamentary influence is exercised primarily via budgetary powers or via ‘naming and shaming’ by way of traditional scrutiny instruments such as parliamentary questions.

The sources of executive dominance differ between policy areas. At its origin can be a desire to shield decision-making from short-term political influence - by for example in the case of Central Banks delegating it to an independent agent. Executive dominance can also stem from the practical need to allow a small group of people to define and – if necessary – adapt a negotiating position for example in international trade negotiations or Brexit negotiations or can arise from concerns about national security and secrecy.

Yet, despite the fact that executive dominance has been intentionally built into the system in most cases, there is also an expectation that the executive institutions in question remain to at least some degree politically accountable; if only to check that they are performing their functions effectively and within the limits and goals defined by laws and constitutions.

Against this background, this panel brings together papers that probe into the capacity of parliaments to ensuring accountability across a range of policy fields.